What Is Bonn Agreement

The Bonn agreement is the oldest regional agreement reached by governments to deal with pollution. A 12-part document entitled «Afghanistan`s Bonn Agreement: A Catalog of Missed Opportunities,» published today by Human Rights Watch, analyzes conditions in the country one year after the agreement that formalized the end of the Taliban regime. The briefing paper outlines a number of areas where the Afghan government and international actors have missed opportunities to improve security and protect human rights. Human Rights Watch makes several recommendations to international and Afghan actors to help implement important provisions of the agreement. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Bonn Agreement laid the groundwork for state reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, supported by the United States and NATO. The agreement aimed to create a new constitution, an independent judiciary, free and fair elections, a centralized sector of security and the protection of the rights of women, including minorities, such as religious and ethnic groups. This model of state-building in Afghanistan was based on a «maximumist model of post-conflict reconstruction» that emerged in the 1990s as a result of international interventions in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa and East Timor. [4] It has now become commonplace to deplore our collective inability to rely more on Afghanistan`s tribal system. In fact, in the last 30 years of the war, the system, which is largely a Pashtun phenomenon, has been severely weakened by the Communists, mujahideen and Taliban — and many educated Afghans are also not asking for their revival. The return of Zahir Shah as head of state in 2002 would have been an opportunity to do so and to counter the Pashtun perception that they were the losers of the Bonn trial.

The old king, who died in 2007, enjoyed great popularity at the time — his reign (1933-1973) remembered with nostalgia the golden years of Afghanistan. Returning from exile in the spring of 2002, the king, when he convened in June of the same year, seemed to be elected head of state by a large majority of the members of the Loya Jirga (ELJ). It shouldn`t be that. Invoking the opposition of some NA warlords, who, in the hope of being removed from their posts, were in the front row of the Loya Jirga, the special representative of the United States imposed himself against Zahir Shah and announced that he would not accept the post of head of state, even if offered to him by the ELJ. This deprived Afghanistan of a very influential voice that could have balanced the influence of the mullahs or breathed new life into the tribal system.